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HOT OFF THE PRESS: AN ARGUMENT FOR A 
FEDERAL SHIELD LAW AFFORDING A 
QUALIFIED EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGE TO 
JOURNALISTS IN LIGHT OF RENEWED 
CONCERNS ABOUT FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 
AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
Nicole N. Wentworth* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Journalists who are forced to choose between revealing a source 
or maintaining confidences face very real consequences for their 
decision. Reporters have spent time in jail, been released of 
confidentiality from their sources to avoid jail time, or paid fines for 
refusing to reveal sources.1 For example, Judith Miller, a reporter for 
the New York Times, controversially spent eighty-five days in jail for 
refusing to reveal her source after being subpoenaed.2 More recently, 
James Risen, also a reporter for the New York Times, appealed to the 
Supreme Court after he was subpoenaed to testify about the identity 
of his confidential source.3 Although his appeal was denied, 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2020, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Political Science and 
Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, June 2016. The author would like to thank the 
wonderful Professor Gary C. Williams, Professor of Evidence, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, 
and the amazing Megan Wilson for their support and encouragement. 
 1. See, e.g., A Look at the Last Nine US Reporters Who Faced the Possibility of Jail Time, 
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (July/Aug. 2014), https://archives.cjr.org/opening_shot/ 
opening_shot_july_august_2014.php; Journalists Jailed or Fined for Refusing to Identify 
Confidential Sources, as of 2019, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM PRESS, 
https://www.rcfp.org/jailed-fined-journalists-confidential-sources/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
 2. Journalists Jailed or Fined for Refusing to Identify Confidential Sources, as of 2019, supra 
note 1. Miller never published an article based on her source’s information, but she was subpoenaed 
to testify before a federal grand jury investigating a leak naming a CIA officer. She was released 
when her source waived confidentiality and she subsequently agreed to testify. The ordeal became 
colloquially deemed, “The Plame Affair.” Timeline: The CIA Leak Case, NPR 
(July 2, 2007, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4764919. 
 3. Federal prosecutors subpoenaed Risen to name the CIA agent who was a source for his 
book investigating CIA activities in Iran. Matt Apuzzo, Times Reporter Will Not Be Called to 
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prosecutors ultimately did not force Risen to choose between 
identifying his source or facing jail time.4 Most journalists facing these 
circumstances have stressed the importance of maintaining 
confidentiality to do their jobs, and have said they are willing to face 
jail time rather than reveal a confidential source.5 Concern about an 
evidentiary privilege for journalists seems to reemerge into the public 
discourse whenever a prominent journalist is facing jail time in 
contempt of court for refusing to reveal a source. 
Recently, the relationship between the Trump administration and 
the press has sparked a renewed debate about a federal shield law.6 In 
particular, President Trump’s response to an anonymous op-ed essay 
published in the New York Times reignited fear for the freedom of the 
press in the United States.7 Trump called the op-ed, which criticized 
him and described a “resistance” within the White House, an act of 
treason.8 Trump subsequently suggested the identity of the source 
 
Testify in Leak Case, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/13/us/times-
reporter-james-risen-will-not-be-called-to-testify-in-leak-case-lawyers-say.html. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See, e.g., Gordon T. Belt, Jailed & Subpoenaed Journalists—A Historical Timeline, 
FREEDOM F. INST., https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Jailed-
subpoenaed-timeline1.pdf (last updated Feb. 2010). 
 6. See, e.g., Paul Fletcher, Sessions’ Testimony Prompts New Federal Shield Law Bill 
Protecting Journalists, FORBES (Nov. 29, 2017, 8:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
paulfletcher/2017/11/29/sessions-testimony-prompts-new-federal-shield-law-bill-protecting-
journalists/#1a4fe1384912; Margot Harris, Is It Finally Time For A Federal Shield Law?, NEWS 
MEDIA ALL. (July 27, 2018), https://www.newsmediaalliance.org/fed-shield-law-2018; Jonathan 
Peters, The Time Is Right for the Journalist Protection Act. But We Need 
a Federal Shield Law, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.cjr.org/united_ 
states_project/journalist-protection-act.php. 
 7. The New York Times noted that publishing an op-ed anonymously is a “rare step.” I Am 
Part of the Resistance Inside the Trump Administration, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/opinion/trump-white-house-anonymous-resistance.html. 
Previously, the New York Times had only published a few anonymously written op-ed pieces, 
usually due to safety reasons. See, e.g., Anonymous, What My 6-Year-Old Son and I Endured in 
Family Detention, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/opinion/ 
family-detention-immigration.html (written anonymously because of gang-related threats); 
Marwan Hisham, Living Beneath the Banner of ISIS, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/15/opinion/living-under-the-sword-of-isis-in-syria.html 
(written under a pen name to protect the author from being targeted by the Islamic State); Laila, A 
Syrian Refugee’s Message to the European Union, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/01/opinion/a-syrian-refugees-message-to-the-european-
union.html (written by a Syrian refugee in Greece using her first name because her family in Syria 
faced threats); Shane M., A Different Iranian Revolution, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/19/opinion/19shane.html (written by a student in Iran who was 
identified only by his first name). 
 8. Michael M. Grynbaum, Anonymous Op-Ed in New York Times Causes a Stir Online and 
in the White House, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018), 
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should be investigated as an issue of national security.9 Although the 
Trump administration never formally launched an investigation into 
the identity of the author of the op-ed,10 Trump’s comments on the 
matter, in combination with his overall attitude towards the press, have 
caused an uproar among journalists and First Amendment proponents. 
Specifically, Trump’s comments have raised concerns about the 
appropriate balance between national security concerns and the 
freedom of the press. Trump’s attempts to address “leaks” from the 
White House have enflamed these concerns, as his actions 
demonstrate a willingness to pursue journalists and the identities of 
their sources. According to James Comey, the FBI director at the time, 
when Comey suggested the need to “make an example” of a journalist 
to dispel further leaks, Trump replied that journalists would be willing 
to reveal their sources after being jailed.11 
While Trump has been blamed for a recent decline in the United 
States’ press freedom,12 the United States has never been well known 
 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/business/media/new-york-times-trump-anonymous.html; 
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 5, 2018, 3:15 PM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1037464177269514240. 
 9. Mark Landler & Katie Benner, Trump Wants Attorney General to Investigate Source of 
Anonymous Times Op-Ed, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/07/us/ 
politics/trump-investigation-times-op-ed.html (“I would say Jeff [Sessions] should be investigating 
who the author of that piece was because I really believe it’s national security.”); see also Donald 
J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 5, 2018, 4:40 PM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1037485664433070080 (“Does the so-called ‘Senior 
Administration Official’ really exist, or is it just the Failing New York Times with another phony 
source? If the GUTLESS anonymous person does indeed exist, the Times must, for National 
Security purposes, turn him/her over to government at once!”). 
 10. See, e.g., Associated Press, Still Anonymous: White House Hunt for Op-Ed Author Fades, 
CNBC (Oct. 6, 2018, 8:10 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/05/still-anonymous-white-house-
hunt-for-op-ed-author-fades.html. New York Times op-ed editor Jim Dao has expressed his doubt 
that the New York Times would be forced to reveal its source even with an investigation as 
“absolutely nothing in the Op-Ed involves criminal behavior.” How the Anonymous Op-Ed Came 
to Be, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/08/reader-center/ 
anonymous-op-ed-trump.html. 
 11. Memorandum from James Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation (Feb. 14, 2017), 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4442900-Ex-FBI-Director-James-Comey-s-
memos.html (“[Trump] replied by saying it may involve putting reporters in jail. ‘They spend a 
couple days in jail, make a new friend, and they are ready to talk.’”). 
 12. 2019 World Press Freedom Index, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, 
https://rsf.org/en/ranking (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). Reporters Without Borders primarily blames 
Trump for the fall in the United States’ ranking from forty-one in 2016 to forty-five in 2018, citing 
his verbal attacks toward journalists, calling the press an enemy of the American people, attempting 
to block White House access from media outlets, and using “fake news” in retaliation for negative 
reporting. Notably, Reporters Without Borders also comments on the United States’ lack of a 
federal shield law. Trump Exacerbates Press Freedom’s Steady Decline, REPORTERS WITHOUT 
BORDERS (2018), https://rsf.org/en/united-states. 
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for its respect for the freedom of the press. Presidents have routinely 
used concerns about national security as a means to control the press. 
For example, following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the 
Bush administration encouraged agencies to remove documents and 
data from their websites,13 limited access to the records of former 
presidents,14 and limited access to records requests made by any 
foreign government or international government organization.15 
Despite championing free access to information as part of his 
campaign, the Obama administration prosecuted more “leakers” under 
the Espionage Act than any former administration following 
unauthorized disclosures that the Obama administration insisted 
revealed state secrets.16 
But the tensions between the press and the government go back 
even further than that. For example, in a much-publicized speech 
before the American Newspaper Publishers Association, President 
Kennedy explained that recent news articles had hurt national security 
by exposing details about covert operations of the United States 
government, and he urged self-censorship of the press.17 As tensions 
between the government and the press increased in the 1960s and 
1970s, the argument for an evidentiary privilege for journalists first 
gained popular attention. As anti-war and more radical activist groups 
formed in response to the Vietnam War, journalism became a 
powerful tool for spreading alternative viewpoints during a time when 
people were growing increasingly disillusioned with the 
 
 13. Adam Clyner, Government Openness at Issue as Bush Holds on to Records, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 3, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/03/us/government-openness-at-issue-as-bush-
holds-on-to-records.html. 
 14. Exec. Order No. 13,233, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,025 (Nov. 1, 2001). The order was later revoked 
by President Obama. Exec. Order No. 13,489, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,669 (Jan. 21, 2009). 
 15. Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-306, § 312, 116 Stat. 2383 
(2002). 
 16. Jason Ross Arnold, Has Obama Delivered the ‘Most Transparent’ Administration in 
History?, WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 2015, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
monkey-cage/wp/2015/03/16/has-obama-delivered-the-most-transparent-administration-in-
history/ (“Although the increase may have resulted partly from the discrete decisions of prosecutors 
as well as improved detection technologies, it also results from the choices of senior officials to 
prosecute leakers under a law targeting spies.”). 
 17. John F. Kennedy, U.S. President, Address Before the American Newspaper Publishers 
Association: The President and the Press (Apr. 27, 1961), in JOHN F. KENNEDY, PUBLIC PAPERS 
OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: JOHN F. KENNEDY: 1961 153 (Warren R. Reid ed., 
1961) (“Every newspaper now asks itself, with respect to every story: ‘Is it news?’ All I suggest is 
that you add the question: ‘Is it in the interest of national security?’”). 
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government.18 Unfortunately, many of these journalists were 
subpoenaed by prosecutors and law enforcement officials to reveal 
their sources and confidential information.19 The tensions between the 
press and the government rose, resulting in a huge increase in 
subpoenas issued to journalists.20 The media began to claim that the 
government was silencing criticism by suppressing unfavorable 
commentary and manipulating the press.21 In response, journalists 
began to make claims of privilege.22 These claims resulted in various 
appeals by the government and the media alike to the Supreme Court, 
culminating in the Court’s first and only decision on whether the First 
Amendment might afford journalists with an evidentiary privilege.23 
Oftentimes, sources will not give information to journalists for 
public access without an assurance that the source will be kept 
confidential. The Supreme Court has rejected the contention that the 
First Amendment affords any such evidentiary privileges to journalists 
facing a grand jury subpoena, and the lower courts have since taken 
different approaches in criminal cases confronting claims of 
journalistic privilege.24 This Note will argue that Congress must pass 
a federal shield law affording journalists a qualified evidentiary 
privilege in order to resolve the differences among the lower courts 
and to ensure the freedom of the press while balancing the need for 
journalistic integrity and national security concerns. Additionally, this 
Note will evaluate the advantages and inadequacies of previously 
proposed federal shield laws and existing state shield laws. 
Part II will establish the current state of the law and the legal 
background surrounding federal shield laws, including an overview of 
evidentiary privileges and subpoenas, the importance of journalistic 
freedom, and the ongoing tension between the freedom of the press 
and national security. Part III will analyze the existing case law and 
state shield laws, the common arguments made in support and 
opposition to a federal shield law, and previously proposed legislation. 
 
 18. Karl H. Schmid, Journalist’s Privilege in Criminal Proceedings: An Analysis of United 
States Courts of Appeals’ Decisions from 1973 to 1999, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1441, 1449 (2002). 
 19. Id. at 1450. 
 20. CBS and NBC alone were reportedly served with 121 subpoenas over the course of only 
two years, most of which involved reports about anti-war groups. Sam J. Ervin, Jr., In Pursuit of a 
Press Privilege, 11 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 233, 245 (1974). 
 21. Id. at 248. 
 22. Schmid, supra note 18, at 1450. 
 23. Infra Part II. 
 24. Infra Part II. 
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Finally, Part IV will provide the justification for a federal shield law 
that properly balances the concerns of the freedom of the press and 
national security. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Legal Background 
1.  Privileges and Their Rationale 
Privileges exclude relevant and reliable evidence from discovery 
or as evidence at trial to protect an interest the government deems 
more important than the interest served by admitting the evidence.25 
Some privileges stem from the common law and others are statutorily 
created. The common law governs a claim of privilege unless the 
United States Constitution, a federal statute, or rules prescribed by the 
Supreme Court provide otherwise.26 In adopting the current federal 
rules of privileges, Congress rejected rules proposed by the Supreme 
Court that would have codified specific privileges, including the 
identity of a government informer.27 Congress also rejected a proposed 
rule that would have prevented federal courts from recognizing any 
other privileges unless they were created by Congress.28 Thus, the 
federal courts are free to develop the law of privileges.29 
Some commonly recognized privileges are attorney-client 
privilege, accountant-client privilege, spousal privilege, clergy 
communications privilege, and physician-patient privilege. These 
privileges are well-rooted in the idea that open communication 
between the parties is necessary. It is hard to imagine a world in which 
a client is unable to speak freely with his attorney because the attorney 
could be called to testify about that information, or where a priest 
could be forced to testify about what a churchgoer told him in a 
confessional. The most often-cited argument supporting the existence 
 
 25. Schmid, supra note 18, at 1448. 
 26. FED. R. EVID. 501. 
 27. DAVID P. LEONARD ET AL., EVIDENCE: A STRUCTURED APPROACH 585 (Rachel E. 
Barkow et al. eds., 4th ed. 2016). Other proposed privileges included an attorney-client privilege 
(FED. R. EVID. 503, Proposed Draft 1972), a psychotherapist-patient privilege (FED. R. EVID. 504, 
Proposed Draft 1972), a husband-wife privilege (FED. R. EVID. 505, Proposed Draft 1972), 
communications to clergymen (FED. R. EVID. 506, Proposed Draft 1972), political votes (FED. R. 
EVID. 507, Proposed Draft 1972), trade secrets (FED. R. EVID. 508, Proposed Draft 1972), and 
secrets of state and other official information (FED. R. EVID. 509, Proposed Draft 1972). 
 28. LEONARD ET AL., supra note 27, at 585–86. 
 29. Id. at 585. 
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of these and other privileges is the utilitarian rationale that privileges 
promote full and frank communication.30 As a result, some scholars 
argue that privileges should be recognized only when it is necessary 
to promote communication between particular classes of people.31 
Privileges are also justified by the interest of privacy in certain close 
relationships for human dignity and a sense of fundamental fairness.32 
Thus, privileges exist where the value of promoting confidential 
communications has been determined to outweigh the value of the 
relevant evidence in a litigation.33 However, the value of privacy has 
not been regarded with as much deference as the utilitarian rationale 
of required full and frank communication.34 
2.  Subpoena Procedures 
Subpoenas are used to require witnesses to provide information 
when they would not voluntarily participate in the litigation otherwise, 
or when they would be unwilling or unable to provide the information 
without a court order. Federal prosecutors have some restrictions on 
their ability to issue a grand jury subpoena, but generally they are 
given wide discretion.35 After a prosecutor issues a subpoena, it can 
be quashed or modified by the court for a variety of reasons, including 
if the subpoena requires the person to provide privileged 
information.36 Generally, a refusal to quash a grand jury subpoena is 
not immediately appealable.37 
If an individual does not appear before the court or provide the 
requested information, the individual has disobeyed the subpoena.38 If 
the witness appears but refuses to testify, the witness is not in contempt 
if the witness has a valid reason not to testify.39 However, if the court 
 
 30. Id. at 584. 
 31. Id. As a result, some evidentiary scholars rejected privileges such as the physician-patient 
privilege, rationalizing that patients would disclose their medical conditions regardless of privilege 
in order to receive adequate treatment. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. As a result, privileges relying on privacy rather than utilitarian rationale have been met 
with various exceptions and even abandoned in some jurisdictions. Id. 
 35. 1 SUSAN W. BRENNER & LORI E. SHAW, FEDERAL GRAND JURY: A GUIDE TO LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 9:2, at 342–43 (2nd ed. 2006). 
 36. 2 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 276 (4th ed. 
2007). 
 37. Id. 
 38. BRENNER & SHAW, supra note 35, § 10:17, at 383. 
 39. Id. 
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finds that the witness has no valid basis for refusing to comply with 
the subpoena, but the witness continues to refuse to testify, the 
prosecutor will need to file a motion to compel the witness to 
comply.40 The court will then hold a hearing on the motion at which 
the witness can explain any reason for refusing to comply with the 
subpoena.41 After the hearing, the court may order the witness to 
comply with the subpoena, and refusal at that point will mean that the 
individual disobeyed the subpoena.42 The subpoena is a court order, 
meaning that willfully violating a subpoena may subject the person to 
civil or criminal contempt.43 While the government typically initiates 
a civil contempt action rather than criminal contempt, the federal rules 
do not require federal prosecutors to do so.44 
B.  Importance of Journalistic Freedom 
The First Amendment of the Constitution reads in relevant part, 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or 
of the press.”45 The amendment was intended to protect the press and 
allow the media to serve as a check on the government.46 Particularly, 
the Framers were concerned with government censorship of political 
opposition and sought to prevent censorship of unpopular viewpoints. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has often noted the importance of the 
freedom of the press in a functioning democracy and stated that a free 
press is vital to the basic purpose of the First Amendment.47 By 
promising a free press, the First Amendment ensures an independent 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. § 10:17, at 384. 
 42. Id. 
 43. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(G) (“The court (other than a magistrate judge) may hold in contempt 
a witness who, without adequate excuse, disobeys a subpoena issued by a federal court in that 
district. A magistrate judge may hold in contempt a witness who, without adequate excuse, disobeys 
a subpoena issued by that magistrate judge as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 636(e).”). 
 44. BRENNER & SHAW, supra note 35, § 10:17, at 382; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(G) 
(explaining that the court may hold a witness in contempt without instructing when civil or criminal 
contempt is appropriate). 
 45. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 46. E.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring) 
(“In the absence of the governmental checks and balances present in other areas of our national life, 
the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power in the areas of national defense and 
international affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry—in an informed and critical public opinion 
which alone can here protect the values of democratic government. For this reason, it is perhaps 
here that a press that is alert, aware, and free most vitally serves the basic purpose of the First 
Amendment. For without an informed and free press there cannot be an enlightened people.”). 
 47. See, e.g., id. at 717 (Black, J., concurring). 
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means of verifying the official accounts of information given to the 
public by the government.48 As a result, the press is often credited with 
exposing corruption and government deception to the public.49 In this 
way, the press plays a vital role in any democracy by informing the 
public and educating the electorate, again providing a check on the 
government.50 
C.  Tension Between the Freedom of the Press and National Security 
It is often necessary for the government to maintain secrecy for 
national security purposes when advantages of information or 
weapons are only effective if they remain a secret from other nations.51 
Similarly, it is necessary for the government to maintain secrecy when 
information would reveal disadvantages that would pose threats or 
cause vulnerability to the nation if it was not kept a secret.52 However, 
the concept of secrecy for national security purposes is often in 
conflict with the democratic notion of freedom of information.53 As 
discussed above, a citizenry informed by the press is a necessary check 
on official misconduct and misguided policy.54 While transparency in 
 
 48. Honorable Martin L. C. Feldman, U.S. Dist. Judge for the E. Dist. of La., Address at the 
Heritage Foundation: Why the First Amendment Is Not Incompatible with National Security 
Interests: Maintaining a Constitutional Perspective (Jan. 14, 1987), in WHY THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS, 90 HERITAGE 
LECTURES 1, 6 (1987) (“Public access to information regarding government practices and policies 
is essential to enlightened public debate and informed self-government. That concept is enshrined 
in the First Amendment, which ensures that there shall be an independent means of verifying 
official accounts of transactions of government.”). 
 49. The most classic example is the “Watergate” scandal, where the Washington Post was 
credited with exposing the burgling of the Democratic National Committee headquarters. See 
generally CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN (1994) (outlining 
the investigative reporting of the Washington Post journalists and the subsequent Watergate 
scandal). Numerous less well-known examples exist. See Aymo Brunetti & Beatrice Weder, A Free 
Press Is Bad News for Corruption, 87 J. PUB. ECON. 1801, 1806 (Aug. 2003) (examining the 
relationship between the freedom of the press and the amount of corruption in various countries); 
see also Christopher Starke et al., Free to Expose Corruption: The Impact of Media Freedom, 
Internet Access, and Governmental Online Service Delivery on Corruption, 10 INT’L J. COMM. 
4702, 4704 (2016) (examining how new forms of journalism and media freedom generally have 
increased the likelihood of exposing corrupt officials). 
 50. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1201 (Rachel 
E. Barkow et al. eds., 6th ed. 2019) (“Freedom of the press arguably reflects the important and 
unique role of informing the public and thereby checking the government.”). 
 51. Feldman, supra note 48, at 2–4. 
 52. Id. at 3. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 6. 
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government is vital for democracy, citizens generally do not have a 
First Amendment right to access government information.55 
The proper balance between the concepts of a free press and 
national security is heavily debated among scholars and politicians. 
Information is often classified under national security rationales which 
presume that the public should not possess some information.56 The 
Freedom of Information Act exempts properly classified information 
from disclosure,57 and Congress has enacted a regulatory scheme 
criminalizing the disclosure of information that they believe would be 
a threat to national security.58 This regulatory scheme includes the 
Espionage Act, which criminalizes the willful disclosure of 
“information relating to the national defense” when the person has 
“reason to believe” the material “could be used to the injury of the 
United States or to the advantage of any foreign nations.”59 The Act 
may encompass journalists who disseminate restricted information 
related to the national defense.60 
The judiciary has also commented on the balance of national 
security with the freedom of the press. In New York Times Co. v. 
United States,61 colloquially known as the “Pentagon Papers” case, the 
government sought to prevent the New York Times and the Washington 
Post from publishing the contents of a classified study on Vietnam 
policy.62 The government argued that the First Amendment was not 
intended to “make it impossible for the Executive to function or to 
protect the security of the United States.”63 The government relied on 
 
 55. Robert Bejesky, National Security Information Flow: From Source to Reporter’s 
Privilege, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 399, 399 (2012). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
 58. Feldman, supra note 48, at 7–8. 
 59. 18 U.S.C. § 793 (2012). 
 60. Feldman, supra note 48, at 7. The scope of the Espionage Act is still unclear, but 
journalists’ concern with the scope of the Act was reignited when Julian Assange, founder of 
WikiLeaks, was charged with violating the Act by seeking and disseminating classified 
information. The press drew parallels between Assange’s activities and the activities of journalists: 
both had the goal of informing the public about the actions of the government, often information 
the government did not want to be exposed. See, e.g., Devin Barrett et al., WikiLeaks Founder 
Julian Assange Charged with Violating Espionage Act, WASH. POST, (May 23, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/wikileaks-founder-julian-assange-charged-
with-violating-espionage-act/2019/05/23/42a2c6cc-7d6a-11e9-a5b3-34f3edf1351e_story.html; 
see also Infra Part III (including a discussion of whether Julian Assange should be considered a 
“journalist”). 
 61. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). 
 62. Id. at 714. 
 63. Id. at 718 (Black, J., concurring). 
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national security concerns to make this argument and claimed that the 
executive branch had the power to “protect the Nation against 
publication of information whose disclosure would endanger the 
national security.”64 The Court rejected the government’s sweeping 
claims but recognized the importance of government secrecy. The 
Court did not go so far as to say that the First Amendment would never 
permit an injunction against publishing confidential information.65 
However, the Court ultimately decided that the government had not 
met the heavy burden to prove that it would be improper to 
disseminate the information.66 
In an often-cited concurring opinion joined by Justice Douglas, 
Justice Black argued that the publication of news should never be 
prevented, and “[s]uch a holding would make a shambles of the First 
Amendment.”67 Relying on the history and language of the First 
Amendment, Justice Black wrote that the press must be free to publish 
news regardless of the source without censorship or restraint.68 
Allowing the executive branch to restrict the freedom of the press by 
relying on national security concerns would “wipe out the First 
Amendment.”69 Justice Black rejected that national security could 
ever be invoked to restrict the public’s liberty under the First 
Amendment, even at the risk of exposing military and diplomatic 
secrets.70 
In stark contrast, in his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart wrote 
that on issues of national security, “the frequent need for absolute 
secrecy is, of course, self-evident.”71 His rationale was based on the 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. The Court’s per curiam opinion merely stated that the government had not met the heavy 
burden established by prior case law. Id. at 714. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart stated 
that the government would be able to restrict publication of classified information if it would 
“surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people.” Id. at 730 
(Stewart, J., concurring). 
 66. Id. at 714 (per curiam). 
 67. Id. at 715 (Black, J., concurring). 
 68. Id. at 717. 
 69. Id. at 719. 
 70. Id. (“The word ‘security’ is a broad, vague generality whose contours should not be 
invoked to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment. The guarding of 
military and diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed representative government provides no 
real security for our Republic. The Framers of the First Amendment, fully aware of both the need 
to defend a new nation and the abuses of the English and Colonial governments, sought to give this 
new society strength and security by providing that freedom of speech, press, religion, and 
assembly should not be abridged.”). 
 71. Id. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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inherent presumption that international diplomacy and effective 
national defense often require secrecy.72 The Court’s ultimate ruling 
in this case was a result of a careful balance of this concern and the 
democratic principle of freedom of the press. The result of the Court’s 
ruling and the various concurring opinions is that the press have a 
general right to disseminate classified information, but this ability is 
restricted when revealing the information would undermine national 
security and when the information is not particularly relevant to the 
public interest.73 
Claims of national security are susceptible to being invoked 
improperly by the government as a basis for restriction of freedom of 
speech.74 In more than sixty cases, the government has invoked the 
“state secrets” privilege to block the release in litigation of material 
that would purportedly cause harm to national security if disclosed.75 
The government has employed the privilege not just for national 
security, but to protect itself from embarrassment or to prevent 
exposing government misconduct.76 For example, the Air Force 
invoked the privilege in a litigation to keep an accident report 
confidential.77 When the report was declassified years later, the 
accident report did not reveal any state secrets but instead exposed the 
Air Force’s failure to make repairs to the aircraft.78 The danger of 
upsetting the balance between national security and freedom of 
information changes with advances in technology and with each 
change in administration. The current scheme relies heavily on the 
courts along with the good faith of the press and the government to 
strike this balance. 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 714 (per curiam). 
 74. Feldman, supra note 48, at 12. 
 75. Government Engaging in Pattern of Cover-Up; Whistleblowers Silenced at the Expense 
of Our Safety, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/government-engaging-pattern-cover-
whistleblowers-silenced-expense-our-safety (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Barry Siegel, A Daughter Discovers What Really Happened, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2004), 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2004-apr-19-na-b29parttwo19-story.html. 
 78. Id. 
(11) 53.3_WENTWORTH (DO NOT DELETE) 7/10/2020  12:29 PM 
2020] ARGUMENT FOR A FEDERAL SHIELD LAW 757 
D.  State of the Law 
1.  Branzburg v. Hayes 
The landmark Supreme Court case on journalistic privilege is 
Branzburg v. Hayes,79 a five-four decision in which the Court held that 
journalists who agree to keep a source confidential do not have a 
constitutional testimonial privilege under the First Amendment.80 The 
case arose when reporter Paul Branzburg refused to testify before state 
grand juries about his confidential sources.81 Branzburg had written 
two articles about the drug trade in Louisville, Kentucky, after 
observing and interviewing people using drugs.82 The appellants in the 
two companion cases, In re Pappas83 and Caldwell v. United States,84 
were two reporters covering activity within the Black Panther 
organization who were also called to testify before grand juries.85 
Ultimately, the Court decided that the First Amendment’s freedom of 
speech and press was not abridged by requiring journalists to appear 
and testify before state or federal grand juries.86 
The journalist-petitioners argued for the creation of a journalistic 
privilege. They argued that in order to gather news, it is necessary that 
journalists agree to keep their source a secret or agree to publish only 
part of the facts revealed.87 If a journalist were forced to reveal this 
information to a grand jury, sources would be deterred from revealing 
information. The result would be to the detriment of the free flow of 
information protected by the First Amendment.88 Notably, the 
journalists did not argue for an absolute privilege but asserted they 
should be afforded a qualified privilege.89 The privilege would only 
allow journalists to refuse to appear or testify if the information was 
unavailable from other sources and the need for the information was 
“sufficiently compelling to override the claimed invasion of First 
 
 79. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
 80. Id. at 708. 
 81. Id. at 668–70. 
 82. Id. at 667–68.  
 83. 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev’d sub nom. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).   
 84.  266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971), aff’g sub nom. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).    
 85. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672–79. 
 86. Id. at 667. 
 87. Id. at 679. 
 88. Id. at 680. 
 89. Id. 
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Amendment interests” resulting from the disclosure.90 The journalists 
argued the burden on news gathering resulting from forcing reporters 
to disclose this information outweighed any public interest in 
obtaining the information.91 
The majority rejected the journalists’ arguments but did recognize 
the importance of news gathering, free speech, and press.92 However, 
the Court ultimately found that requiring a journalist to reveal their 
source would not constitute an intrusion or restriction upon the press.93 
Justice White, writing for the majority, wrote that the First 
Amendment “does not invalidate every incidental burdening of the 
press.”94 Moreover, any burden claimed by the journalists was 
“uncertain” and would not threaten the majority of confidential 
relationships between journalists and their sources.95 The Court placed 
the public interest in pursuing and prosecuting crimes reported to the 
press over the public interest in possible future news about crime from 
undisclosed sources.96 
Although the Court did not grant any testimonial privilege for 
journalists, in dicta, the Court commented on the distinction between 
an absolute and qualified privilege. The Court reasoned that a 
qualified privilege would not be a satisfactory solution to journalists’ 
fear that sources would be deterred “whenever a judge determines the 
situation justifies.”97 Thus, the Court seemed to recognize the potential 
faults in schemes of qualified privilege. Although the Court ultimately 
decided that any testimonial privileges for journalists should be 
granted by a legislature rather than the courts,98 two separate dissents 
would have held otherwise. 
In the first dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart, joined by Justices 
Brennan and Marshall, argued that the Court’s decision would “impair 
performance of the press’ constitutionally protected functions” and 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 681. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 681–82. 
 94. Id. at 682. 
 95. Id. at 690–91. 
 96. Id. at 695 (“[W]e cannot accept the argument that the public interest in possible future 
news about crime from undisclosed, unverified sources must take precedence over the public 
interest in pursuing and prosecuting those crimes reported to the press by informants and in thus 
deterring the commission of such crimes in the future.”). 
 97. Id. at 702. 
 98. Id. at 706. 
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hamper the administration of justice.99 Justice Stewart argued that the 
confidential relationship between a journalist and his source “stems 
from the broad societal interest in a full and free flow of information 
to the public” vital to a free press.100 Justice Stewart recognized that 
confidentiality is essential to the creation and maintenance of a news 
gathering relationship with informants.101 He argued that failing to 
protect this confidential relationship would deter sources from giving 
information and would deter journalists from gathering and publishing 
that information.102 As a result of the majority’s decision, a journalist 
may be forced to choose between being punished for refusing to testify 
or disclosing confidential information in violation of his professional 
ethics and impairing his resourcefulness as a journalist in the future.103 
Thus, when the journalist and the source cannot rely on 
confidentiality, valuable information will not be discovered or be 
published, to the detriment of the public.104 
While Justice Stewart recognized the importance of a journalist’s 
evidentiary privilege, he still argued for a qualified, rather than 
absolute privilege. To compel a journalist to reveal his source, Justice 
Stewart would have required the government to show probable cause 
to believe that the journalist has information “that is clearly relevant 
to a specific probable violation of law,” that the information cannot be 
sought by other means, and that there is a “compelling and overriding 
interest” in the information sought.105 
Justice Douglas went a step further, arguing in a separate dissent 
that an absolute privilege should protect journalists under the First 
Amendment.106 He believed that the First Amendment gave the press 
an “absolute and unqualified” privilege, and that the drafters of the 
First Amendment had balanced the needs of the government with the 
need for an uncensored flow of opinion and reporting.107 Thus, there 
 
 99. Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 100. Id. at 725–26. 
 101. Id. at 728. 
 102. Id. at 728 (“[A]n unbridled subpoena power—the absence of a constitutional right 
protecting, in any way, a confidential relationship from compulsory process—will either deter 
sources from divulging information or deter reporters from gathering and publishing 
information.”). 
 103. Id. at 731–32. 
 104. Id. at 736. 
 105. Id. at 743. 
 106. See id. at 712 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 107. Id. at 712, 715. 
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could be no compelling need which qualified a journalist’s immunity 
from appearing or testifying before a grand jury.108 
Justice Douglas also cautioned that any qualified privilege would 
be “twisted and relaxed so as to provide virtually no protection at all” 
as the country’s values and politics changed.109 He chastised the 
majority for impeding the dissemination of ideas by failing to protect 
the free press and forcing a journalist to testify.110 Similar to the 
journalist-petitioners, Justice Douglas argued that forcing a journalist 
to testify would quell communication between sources and journalists, 
and restrain journalists who would fear being forced to reveal their 
sources.111 In making this argument, Justice Douglas recognized the 
preferred position of journalists in an effective self-government 
system because of their crucial duty to bring information to the 
public.112 He feared that without an evidentiary privilege, journalists 
would become victims of government pressure and their sources 
would fear exposure, resulting in journalists’ inability to provide news 
beyond that which the government allowed.113 In making this 
comment, Justice Douglas noted the importance of the press in 
inviting radical ideas and challenging the status quo.114 
Given the close decision, the proper interpretation of the 
Branzburg decision was unclear and left largely to the lower courts. 
Adding to the confusion was Justice Powell’s short concurring 
opinion, in which he emphasized that the Court’s holding was 
limited.115 Justice Powell believed that the courts should determine 
whether a journalist had a privilege against testifying by balancing the 
freedom of the press with “the obligation of all citizens to give relevant 
testimony with respect to criminal conduct.”116 Justice Stewart 
 
 108. Id. at 712. 
 109. Id. at 720. 
 110. Id. at 720–21. 
 111. Id. at 721. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 722 (“If what the Court sanctions today becomes settled law, then the reporter’s main 
function in American society will be to pass on to the public the press releases which the various 
departments of government issue.”). 
 114. Id. at 721–22. 
 115. Id. at 709–10 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 116. Id. at 710. 
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characterized Justice Powell’s concurrence as “enigmatic,” a 
foreshadowing of the confusion to come in the lower courts.117 
2.  Post-Branzburg Lower Court Decisions 
After Branzburg, the Supreme Court refused to hear another case 
where a journalist claimed evidentiary privilege against revealing a 
confidential source.118 Following the decision, some state and federal 
courts have followed the majority and afforded no evidentiary 
privilege to journalists while other courts have applied a qualified 
privilege as proposed by Justice Stewart’s dissent.119 Following the 
case-by-case balancing test posited by Justice Powell, most federal 
appellate courts have interpreted Branzburg as recognizing a qualified 
First Amendment privilege for journalists.120 In contrast, the Sixth 
Circuit followed the majority opinion strictly and decided journalists 
do not have a privilege in grand jury proceedings.121 Similarly, the 
Seventh Circuit has decided there is no journalistic privilege beyond 
requiring that subpoenas are “reasonable in the circumstances.”122 
However, federal and state courts have recognized a First 
Amendment-based journalist’s privilege in situations factually 
different from Branzburg.123 For instance, as the Branzburg ruling 
only addressed journalists’ claims of privilege when facing grand jury 
subpoenas, the situation has differed when prosecutors and criminal 
 
 117. Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In a footnote, Justice Stewart commented further on 
Justice Powell’s concurring opinion, saying that the opinion left room “for the hope that in some 
future case the Court may take a less absolute position.” Id. at 746 n.36. 
 118. Schmid, supra note 18, at 1453–54. Most appeals are based on the theory that Branzburg 
left open the narrow claim for privilege when a journalist is being harassed by the government. Id. 
at 1454. 
 119. Id. at 1453–54. 
 120. See, e.g., Titan Sports, Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. (In re Madden), 151 F.3d 125, 128–
29 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 971 (5th Cir. 1998); Shoen v. Shoen, 5 
F.3d 1289, 1292–93 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Long (In re Shain), 978 F.2d 850, 852 (4th 
Cir. 1992); United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1181–82 (1st Cir. 1988); Von 
Bulow v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 
1504 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 121. Storer Commc’ns Inc. v. Giovan (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 810 F.2d 580, 584–86 
(6th Cir. 1987) (holding that a television reporter had no First Amendment privilege to withhold 
information sought by grand jury). 
 122. McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2003) (“It seems to us that rather than 
speaking of privilege, courts should simply make sure that a subpoena . . . is reasonable in the 
circumstances, which is the general criterion for judicial review of subpoenas.”); see also U.S. 
Dep’t of Educ. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 481 F.3d 936, 938 (7th Cir. 2007) (“There isn’t 
even a reporter’s privilege in federal cases.”). 
 123. Schmid, supra note 18, at 1442. 
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defendants have subpoenaed journalists.124 The result is that following 
Branzburg, whether or not a journalist has an evidentiary privilege has 
depended largely on what court they have found themselves in. 
3.  Existing State Shield Laws 
The Court in Branzburg left open the possibility of state or federal 
legislation affording either a qualified or absolute privilege to 
journalists.125 At the time Branzburg was decided, only seventeen 
states afforded some statutory protection to a journalist’s confidential 
sources, each with varying levels of privilege.126 After the Supreme 
Court invited federal and state legislatures to provide protections, 
more states began to pass state shield laws. As of this writing, forty-
eight states and the District of Columbia now afford varying levels of 
testimonial privileges to journalists through their state statutes or 
constitution, common law recognition based on the First Amendment, 
or both.127 However, state protections vary in scope and none can 
protect journalists from being compelled to reveal their sources during 
a federal investigation.128 
Sixteen states and the District of Columbia have enacted shield 
laws affording an absolute privilege for journalists protecting their 
sources.129 Twenty-four states have enacted shield laws where the 
 
 124. Both grand juries and prosecutors seek information from journalists less frequently than 
criminal defendants but are often more successful. Grand juries and prosecutors are granted 
subpoena power by statute and common law while criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment 
right to compel disclosure of information on their behalf. Id. at 1465. 
 125. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972) (“At the federal level, Congress has 
freedom to determine whether a statutory newsman’s privilege is necessary and desirable . . . . 
There is also merit in leaving state legislatures free, within First Amendment limits, to fashion their 
own standards . . . . It goes without saying, of course, that we are powerless to bar state courts from 
responding in their own way and construing their own constitutions so as to recognize a newsman’s 
privilege, either qualified or absolute.”). 
 126. Id. at 689 n.27. 
 127. Harris, supra note 6. Wyoming is the only state that has never had a state shield law or a 
common law privilege for journalists, and as of this writing, no bill has ever been filed in the state 
legislature. What’s up with Wyoming and the Reporter’s Privilege?, NEWS MEDIA & L., Fall 2008, 
at 37, 37. Currently, Hawaii does not have a shield law either, as its model shield law had a sunset 
provision and expired in 2013. Paul W. Taylor, The Perils of Protecting the Press, GOVERNING, 
July 2013, at 16, 16. 
 128. Harris, supra note 6. 
 129. Alabama (ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (2019)), Alaska (ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.300–
09.25.390 (West 2019)), Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (2019)), California (CAL. 
EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 2009)), District of Columbia (D.C. CODE § 16-4702 (2019)), Indiana 
(IND. CODE §§ 34-46-4-1 to 34-46-4-2 (2019)), Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (West 
2019)), Maryland (MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (West 2019)), Montana (MONT. 
CODE. ANN. §§ 26-1-902 to 26-1-903 (2019)), Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to 20-147 
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privilege is qualified or contains exceptions.130 Eight other states still 
have not enacted a shield law, but their state courts have recognized a 
privilege for sources that is qualified or contains exceptions.131 
Of those states which afford only a qualified privilege, the 
protections are widely varied. Some shield laws only protect the 
identity of sources, not unpublished or confidential information; 
others do the opposite and only protect information and not sources.132 
Some states expressly limit the privilege when information is sought 
in a libel litigation.133 Some states even protect journalists from third-
 
(2019)), Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275 (2019)), New York (N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h 
(McKinney 2009)), Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04, 2739.12 (West 2019)), Oregon (OR. 
REV. STAT. §§ 44.510–44.540 (2019)), Pennsylvania (42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5942(a) (2019)), 
Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1615 (2019)), Washington (WASH. REV. CODE § 5.68.010 
(2019)), and Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. § 885.14 (2019)). 
 130. Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 (2019)), Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-
119 (West 2019)), Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146t (2019)), Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 10, §§ 4320–26 (2019)), Florida (FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (2019)), Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 24-
5-508 (2019)), Illinois (735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-901–5/8-909 (2019)), Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 60-480 to 60-482 (West 2019)), Louisiana (LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451–45:1454, 45:1459 
(2019)), Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 61 (2019)), Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§§ 767.5a, 767A.6 (2019)), Minnesota (MINN. STAT. §§ 595.021–595.025 (2019)), New Jersey 
(N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21, 2A:84A021.1 (West 2019)), New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 38-6-7 (West 2019)), North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.11 (2019)), North Dakota (N.D. 
CENT. CODE ANN. § 31-01-06.2 (West 2019)), Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West 
2019)), Rhode Island (9 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 9-19.1-1 to 9-19.1-3 (West 2019)), South 
Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-100 (2019)), Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 
(2019)), Texas (TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 22.024 (West 2019); TEX. CODE CRIM. 
PROC. ANN. art. 38.11–38.111 (West 2019)), Utah (UTAH R. EVID. CODE § 509 (West 2019)), West 
Virginia (W. VA. CODE § 57-3-10 (2019), and Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. § 885.14 (2019)). 
 131. Idaho (Idaho v. Kiss (In re Contempt of Wright), 700 P.2d 40 (Idaho 1985)), Iowa 
(Waterloo/Cedar Falls Courier v. Hawkeye Cmty. Coll., 646 N.W.2d 97 (Iowa 2002)), 
Massachusetts (In re John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 574 N.E.2d 373 (Mass. 1991); Sinnott v. 
Bos. Ret. Bd., 524 N.E.2d 100 (Mass. 1988)), Mississippi (State v. Hardin, Crim. No. 3558, (Cir. 
Ct. Yalobusha Cty., Mar. 23, 1983); Hawkins v. Williams, No. 2900054 (Cir. Cty. Hinds Cty., Mar. 
16, 1983)), Missouri (State ex. rel. Classic III, Inc. v. Ely, 954 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 
1997)), New Hampshire (State v. Siel, 444 A.2d 499 (N.H. 1982); Op. of Justices, 373 A.2d 644 
(N.H. 1977)), South Dakota (Hopewell v. Midcontinent Broad. Corp., 538 N.W.2d 780 (S.D. 
1995)), and Virginia (Brown v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 429 (Va. 1974); Clemente v. Clemente, 
56 Va. Cir. 530 (2001); Philip Morris Cos. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 36 Va. Cir. 1 (1995)). 
 132. Leslie Siegel, Trampling on the Fourth Estate: The Need for a Federal Reporter Shield 
Law Providing Absolute Protection Against Compelled Disclosure of Sources and Information, 67 
OHIO ST. L.J. 469, 498 (2006). 
 133. Georgia (GA CODE ANN. § 24-5-508 (2019)), Illinois (735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-901–5/8-
909 (2019)), Louisiana (LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451–45:1454, 45:1459 (2019)), Minnesota (MINN. 
STAT. §§ 595.021–595.025 (2019)), Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. §§ 44.510–44.540 (2011)), Rhode 
Island (9 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 9-19.1-1 to 9-19.1-3 (West 2019)), and Tennessee (TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 24-1-208 (2019)). 
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party subpoenas that could reveal underlying sources.134 Some states 
only protect journalists from being held in contempt for failure to 
disclose information rather than afford them an actual evidentiary 
privilege, which leaves the journalist vulnerable to other discovery 
sanctions in a civil litigation.135 
When the privilege relies on the courts, the qualified privilege is 
often subject to a balancing test which again varies widely from state 
to state.136 Among other factors, state courts will consider the 
importance of the information to the case, the availability of the 
information from other sources, and whether the case is civil or 
criminal.137 Then, even if the tests are similar, the results will differ 
widely based on the discretion of the presiding judge. These are 
merely a few examples of the vast differences that exist among the 
protections afforded to journalists in the different states. 
Even those state shield laws which facially provide an absolute 
privilege have been undermined in some states. For instance, criminal 
defendants invoking the Sixth Amendment against a shield law have 
prompted courts to balance the privilege against the defendant’s need 
for information.138 Similarly, courts have restricted or eliminated 
statutory protection when the journalist was an eyewitness or when the 
journalist was the defendant of a libel suit.139 
The states also vary in who qualifies as a journalist to be afforded 
protection in the state. Some states extend the privilege to anyone 
involved in the news gathering process, such as editors and 
publishers.140 Some states only apply the privilege to full-time media 
employees, while others extend the privilege beyond this narrow scope 
to student journalists, authors, or online publishers.141 The differences 
 
 134. California (CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 2009)), Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-
146t (2019)), Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-902 to 26-1-903 (2019)), and Washington 
(WASH. REV. CODE § 5.68.010 (2019)). 
 135. California (CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 2009)) and New York (N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW 
§ 79-h (McKinney 2009)). 
 136. Jonathan Peters, Shield Laws and Journalist’s Privilege: The Basics Every Reporter 
Should Know, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.cjr.org/united_states_ 
project/journalists_privilege_shield_law_primer.php. 
 137. Id. 
 138. 1 DAVID M. GREENWALD ET AL., TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 8:6 (3d ed. 2019). 
 139. Id. 
 140. See, e.g., Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-119(1)(c) (West 2019)), Florida 
(FLA. STAT. § 90.5015(1)(a) (2019)), Minnesota (MINN. STAT. § 595.023 (2019)), Oklahoma 
(OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2506(A)(7) (2019)). 
 141. Peters, supra note 136. 
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among the states as to who qualifies as a journalist is particularly 
concerning given the growing use of the internet and new technology 
in reporting today, which has given rise to a number of independent 
authors untethered to media companies. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Evaluation of the State of the Law 
1.  Evaluation of Case Law 
The case law as it exists is insufficient to provide reassurance to 
journalists or their sources that information can be kept confidential. 
Depending on which circuit the subpoena is issued in, a journalist may 
have no privilege at all, or a qualified privilege based on subjective 
standards. Because most federal courts use a balancing test that is left 
to the discretion of the judge, there is little to no reassurance for 
journalists that they can keep sources confidential. The particularities 
of a certain judge can determine whether or not a journalist is forced 
to comply with a subpoena, something which the journalist has no 
foresight or control over. Some judges may be more inclined than 
others to modify or quash a subpoena, and some may be more 
sympathetic than others to certain parties. In fact, there is already some 
evidence that courts’ decisions based on current privilege case law 
depend on the identity of the subpoenaing party.142 Which approach a 
court follows post-Branzburg can also be determinative as it directs 
the burden of proof required for the subpoenaing party.143 
As evidenced by the different outcomes in the lower courts post-
Branzburg, the Supreme Court left many unanswered questions for 
situations factually distinct from Branzburg. For example, it was 
unclear whether the burden on the subpoenaing party might be lower 
when information is non-confidential, unlike in Branzburg where the 
information sought was confidential.144 This provides another layer of 
confusion for journalists, as the lower courts must decide the level of 
 
 142. Schmid, supra note 18, at 1466 (finding criminal defendants have lower success rates than 
grand juries and prosecutors). 
 143. Id. at 1481–82. 
 144. The First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have suggested that the party 
subpoenaing confidential information might be required to meet a higher burden of proof than a 
party subpoenaing non-confidential information. Id. at 1496–97. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that requests for confidentiality would be irrelevant to the analysis. Id. at 1489. 
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privilege to be afforded in factually unique situations. However, as the 
Supreme Court has consistently refused to revisit the issue of a 
potential journalistic privilege, it is unlikely that the Court will grant 
further guidance on any of these issues. It is even less likely that the 
Court will reconsider their interpretation of Branzburg to afford an 
evidentiary privilege to journalists under a First Amendment rationale. 
Thus, legislative action appears to be the most viable option to protect 
journalists from being forced to identify their confidential sources. 
2.  Evaluation of State Shield Laws 
The result of the vast differences in state-to-state protections is 
that a journalist who publishes an article may be forced to reveal a 
source in one state while having a privilege not to do so in another 
state. In an age where many articles are published online and 
accessible in all areas of the country and even the world, this causes 
obvious problems. For example, a reporter working for the Los 
Angeles Times would be protected against a subpoena in a California 
court under the state’s existing shield law. But suppose the article was 
published and made accessible online, including to residents of 
Wyoming, a state which has no constitutional, statutory, or common 
law recognition of a journalistic privilege. Theoretically, Wyoming 
prosecutors could subpoena the Los Angeles Times reporter and 
compel him to reveal the identity of his confidential sources or 
information. This inconsistency is a result of the current patchwork 
scheme of protection that journalists have, and this is merely the 
simplest example. The results appear even more nonsensical when one 
considers that someone labeled as a journalist under one state’s 
definition might not be covered under another state’s narrower 
definition of a journalist. Inconsistencies similarly arise when a 
subpoena is based on a court-created balancing test which is facially 
similar in two states but generates completely different outcomes 
based on the tendencies of the state’s courts. 
With the increase of media created for a global scale and the 
global accessibility of even local publications as a result of 
technological advances, journalists need a more reliable basis for 
claiming privilege over their confidential sources and information. In 
addition to providing journalists with the protection they currently 
lack in any federal proceeding, a federal shield law would also provide 
some security for journalists against subpoenas from prosecutors in 
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other states. A federal shield law would provide the much-needed 
consistency the scheme of state shield laws currently lacks. 
B.  Potential Solutions 
1.  No Privilege 
The main argument against affording journalists any evidentiary 
privilege is that there is an overwhelming public interest in secrecy for 
national security. Opponents to journalistic privilege argue that the 
public interest in dissemination of information is uncertain, while the 
public interest in maintaining secrecy to protect against a security 
threat is obvious.145 Thus, if a journalist reveals classified information 
publicly, the government could discover the source of the classified 
information because the journalist has no evidentiary privilege. This 
scheme would theoretically prevent the leak of classified information 
that could cause a security threat. 
In the criminal context, opponents to a federal shield law argue 
the privilege would impair a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right to access information proving his or her innocence.146 However, 
existing privileges have the same effect, and those privileges have 
been held to be constitutional even in response to Sixth Amendment 
challenges.147 As with any privilege, the argument against granting the 
privilege is that the interest in promoting the relationship is less 
important than the interest served by admitting the evidence. 
Opponents to a journalistic privilege thus must overcome the First 
Amendment implications of a journalistic privilege and the necessity 
of the free flow of communication between a source and a journalist. 
Another argument against journalistic privilege is the uniqueness 
of the privilege. Current evidentiary privileges are afforded to preserve 
the secrecy of information due to public policy reasons. For example, 
the privilege afforded to doctors and patients is intended to allow 
patients to provide any and all relevant information to their doctor, the 
privilege between spouses is intended to protect the marital 
 
 145. Bejesky, supra note 55, at 447. 
 146. See Welsh S. White, Criminal Law: Evidentiary Privileges and the Defendant’s 
Constitutional Right to Introduce Evidence, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 377, 377–80 (1989) 
(discussing the tension between a criminal defendant’s rights and evidentiary privileges); see also 
Schmid, supra note 18, at 1444 (finding the majority of subpoenas issued to journalists originate 
from criminal defendants). 
 147. GREENWALD ET AL., supra note 138, at § 1:60. 
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relationship, and the privilege afforded to lawyers and clients is 
necessary to provide proper legal representation. In contrast, a 
privilege between journalists and confidential sources would protect 
anonymity in order to release information publicly.148 Thus, unlike 
other privileges, the journalistic privilege is driven at least in part by 
the self-interest of the journalist in releasing a story. This leads 
opponents of a journalistic privilege to fear that journalists may feel 
empowered by possessing a secret source and mistakenly overestimate 
the value of the information being publicly released.149 
Opponents to journalistic privilege also argue that the privilege 
would propagate false news stories. This concern is particularly salient 
with the rise of social media and digital news, which rely on 
sensationalism to increase readership and generate online advertising 
revenue.150 While many of these stories often seem outlandish, studies 
have shown that people believe them nonetheless.151 Even more 
reliable media companies have been exposed for failing to properly 
verify accounts from confidential sources.152 However, the journalism 
profession is based on journalists’ own ethical standards, which 
require them to assess a source’s credibility and the value of 
information.153 Opponents to journalistic privilege argue that denying 
an absolute privilege would make journalists even more conscientious 
about what information they put out to the public without the 
capability to hide behind a claim of privilege.154 
Not granting any privilege would also avoid the difficulty in 
deciding who qualifies for an evidentiary privilege. Opponents fear 
that people would claim to be journalists to invoke the privilege 
undeservedly. For example, Julian Assange revealed the misconduct 
 
 148. Bejesky, supra note 55, at 443. 
 149. Id.; see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 694 (1972) (commenting on journalists’ 
self-interest in claiming the importance of maintaining the secrecy of informants). 
 150. See Elle Hunt, What Is Fake News? How to Spot It and What You Can Do to Stop It, 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 17, 2016, 5:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/dec/18/what-is-
fake-news-pizzagate. 
 151. Id. For example, a poll of Trump supporters revealed that 14 percent believed a false news 
story that Hillary Clinton was connected to a child sex ring run out of a Washington D.C. pizzeria, 
while 32 percent of supporters said they weren’t sure one way or another. Tom Jensen, Trump 
Remains Unpopular; Voters Prefer Obama SCOTUS Pick, PUB. POL’Y POLLING (Dec. 9, 2016), 
https://www.publicpolicypolling.com/polls/trump-remains-unpopular-voters-prefer-obama-on-
scotus-pick/. 
 152. Bejesky, supra note 55, at 438–39. 
 153. Id. at 445–46. 
 154. See, e.g., id. at 446–47. 
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of government officials on his website, WikiLeaks, in a highly 
controversial release of classified information online in 2010. Whether 
or not Assange qualified as a journalist was unclear given the 
untraditional news outlet.155 Some argued that Assange qualified as a 
journalist because he published “truthful information that is of public 
interest” while others argued that he was not a journalist, and merely 
“dumped” the information in whole without providing any judgment 
or curation.156 The situation became increasingly complicated when 
WikiLeaks disseminated documents from the Democratic Party during 
the 2016 presidential elections.157 This is merely one example of the 
problems raised by trying to define the press and journalism in a 
federal shield law. With the emergence of bloggers and other internet-
based media, opponents of a federal shield law worry that there will 
be broad and overreaching claims of privilege.158 As the Supreme 
Court has never clarified who qualifies for the freedom afforded to the 
press under the First Amendment,159 any federal shield law would 
necessarily require Congress to do so. 
Lastly, opponents argue that journalists are sufficiently protected 
without a federal shield law. The majority in Branzburg noted that the 
Attorney General’s set of rules for federal officials in connection with 
subpoenaing members of the press to testify may be sufficient to 
resolve the disagreement between the press and federal officials.160 
Department of Justice guidelines intend to limit the federal 
government from subpoenaing journalists in federal proceedings. The 
policy encourages striking the “proper balance” among several 
interests including protecting national security and safeguarding the 
 
 155. Id. at 454–55. 
 156. David Ignatius, Opinion, Is Julian Assange a Journalist, or Is He Just an Accused Thief? 
WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/is-julian-assange-a-
journalist-or-is-he-just-an-accused-thief/2019/04/11/38afac3c-5c9c-11e9-9625-
01d48d50ef75_story.html. 
 157. Mark Hosenball, WikiLeaks Faces U.S. Probes into 2016 Election Role and CIA Leaks: 
Sources, REUTERS (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia-
wikileaks/wikileaks-faces-u-s-probes-into-its-2016-election-role-and-cia-leaks-sources-
idUSKBN1E12J2. 
 158. Bejesky, supra note 55, at 445–47. 
 159. Ignatius, supra note 156. 
 160. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 n.41 (1972) (arguing the regulations “may prove 
wholly sufficient to resolve the bulk of disagreements and controversies between press and federal 
officials”). 
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role of the free press.161 The guidelines purport to limit subpoenas to 
verifying the published information, require the government to 
exhaust all alternative sources of information, and recommend 
prosecutors negotiate with the journalist before using their subpoena 
authority.162 While the guidelines state that failure to comply with 
these requirements may constitute grounds for reprimand or other 
disciplinary action, this disciplinary impact is at the discretion of the 
Attorney General and does not create any legal right to an individual 
who was faced with a subpoena issued in contravention of the 
guidelines.163 Although some courts cite failure to follow the 
guidelines as a reason for quashing a subpoena,164 others find the 
government’s failure to follow the guidelines irrelevant.165 
The problem with the existing guidelines is twofold. First, the 
guidelines’ instructions to strike the “proper balance” leaves too much 
discretion to the government to compel journalists to reveal their 
sources. The guidelines provide no enforceable rights and are merely 
intended to guide the discretion of prosecutors.166 Thus, it is up to the 
prosecutors to strike the balance without any course of legal redress 
for the subpoenaed journalist. Second, the guidelines are not a statute 
nor established case law, and thus can be changed at the whim of the 
current administration. This could result in an increase in protections, 
such as when the Department of Justice updated the guidelines in 2015 
following a public outcry when it was revealed that the Department of 
Justice had secretly seized records from the Associated Press 
telephone lines.167 However, this could also result in a significant 
 
 161. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(a)(2) (2019) (“In determining whether to seek information from, or 
records of, members of the news media, the approach in every instance must be to strike the proper 
balance among several vital interests: Protecting national security, ensuring public safety, 
promoting effective law enforcement and the fair administration of justice, and safeguarding the 
essential role of the free press in fostering government accountability and an open society.”). 
 162. Id. § 50.10(c)(4)(iii)–(v). 
 163. Id. § 50.10(i), (j). 
 164. See, e.g., In re Williams, 766 F. Supp. 358 (W.D. Pa. 1991). 
 165. See, e.g., United States v. Long (In re Shain), 978 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 166. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(j) (“This policy is not intended to, and does not, create any right or 
benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United 
States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other 
person.”); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(refusing to decide whether the DOJ guidelines were followed by special counsel because the 
guidelines created no enforceable right for appellants). 
 167. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of Attorney General Eric Holder on the 
Justice Department Report of Revised Media Guidelines (July 12, 2013), 
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rollback in protections, as many feared when then-Attorney General 
Jeff Sessions announced in 2017 that he would review policies on 
media subpoenas as part of the Trump administration’s focus on 
government leaks.168 
2.  Absolute Privilege 
The basis of arguments in favor of an absolute privilege are rooted 
in the First Amendment, and proponents argue that an absolute 
privilege would best fulfill the intent of the Framers by allowing 
journalists to serve as a check on the government.169 Proponents argue 
that an absolute shield law would encourage whistleblowers to expose 
government misconduct and allow journalists to serve as a check on 
the government without fearing jail time.170 Proponents also argue that 
an absolute privilege would provide judicial efficiency, as courts 
would not need to balance claims of privilege on a case-by-case 
basis.171 Further, an absolute privilege would promote uniformity of 
the law and prevent uncertainty in protection regardless of the court in 
which a journalist is subpoenaed.172 
Most proponents of an absolute privilege argue that a qualified 
privilege is insufficient to adequately protect journalists. Proponents 
worry that a qualified privilege based on a balancing test would leave 
too much discretion to the courts and perpetuate the current disparity 
of protection that exists as a result of the current scheme.173 One 
argument against a qualified privilege that is commonly raised by 
proponents of an absolute privilege is that a qualified privilege does 
not give journalists enough uniformity to rely on. As Justice Douglas 
cautioned in his dissent in Branzburg, a qualified evidentiary privilege 
can be manipulated by politicians or courts to fit with the politics of 
the time or the politician’s particular view of the worth of state 
 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-attorney-general-eric-holder-justice-department-report-
revised-media-guidelines; see also Gov’t Obtains Wide AP Phone Records in Probe,  
ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 13, 2013), https://www.ap.org/ap-in-the-news/2013/govt-obtains-wide-
ap-phone-records-in-probe (explaining the government seizure and the Associated Press’s 
response). 
 168. Josh Gerstein & Madeline Conway, Sessions: DOJ Reviewing Policies on Media 
Subpoenas, POLITICO (Aug. 4, 2017, 1:45 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/04/doj-
reviewing-policies-on-media-subpoenas-sessions-says-241329. 
 169. Siegel, supra note 132, at 474–75. 
 170. Id. at 524. 
 171. E.g., id. at 473. 
 172. Id. at 521. 
 173. Id. at 520. 
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objectives.174 The majority also believed that a qualified privilege 
would not be effective in instilling confidence in sources that their 
identities would not be revealed.175 
Without an absolute privilege, proponents worry that journalists 
will engage in self-censorship, and the public will not receive vital 
information uncovering government misconduct.176 Proponents also 
argue that having no absolute privilege will lead to the self-censorship 
of sources who investigate the current scheme of protection and realize 
that their confidentiality is not assured unless the journalist is willing 
to go to jail for them.177 
3.  Qualified Privilege 
Although the argument for a qualified evidentiary privilege relies 
on many of the same First Amendment freedom of the press arguments 
as proponents of an absolute privilege, a qualified privilege provides 
a fair balance between the concerns of a free press and national 
security. Most previously proposed federal legislation has been federal 
shield laws affording journalists with a qualified privilege. A law 
providing for a qualified privilege is more likely to gain support than 
a law providing for an absolute privilege, which many fear would 
improperly impede upon the government’s need for secrecy for 
national security purposes. Under a qualified scheme, the government 
would still be able to prosecute individuals for criminal acts or acts of 
terrorism, or to pursue leakers of information that improperly exposed 
state secrets. Most states have opted for a qualified evidentiary 
privilege under their respective state protections, and even those states 
with absolute privileges have found their privilege undercut by 
constitutional concerns.178 Thus, the current scheme evidences more 
support and less pushback for a qualified privilege than an absolute 
privilege. 
 
 174. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 711 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 175. Id. at 702 (majority opinion). 
 176. Siegel, supra note 132, at 524. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Supra Part II. 
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C.  Evaluation of Previous Legislative Attempts 
at Federal Shield Laws 
Even at the time Branzburg was decided, federal statutes granting 
journalists a testimonial privilege had already been proposed.179 More 
recently, a federal shield law titled “The Free Flow of Information 
Act” has been regularly introduced in Congress. The Free Flow of 
Information Act of 2007 was passed by the House of Representatives 
by a significant bipartisan majority of 398–21 but did not pass a 
cloture vote in the Senate in 2008,180 in part because of the opposition 
by the Department of Justice and the threat of a potential veto by 
President George W. Bush, who was concerned about the impact the 
legislation would have on terrorism concerns.181 Similarly, the Free 
Flow of Information Act of 2009 passed the House and was never 
voted on by the Senate.182 The Free Flow of Information Act of 2013 
was introduced to the Senate but was not enacted before the Congress 
adjourned.183 In 2015, the House passed an amendment to another 
House bill to protect journalists, but the provision was removed from 
the version that ultimately passed the Senate.184 
The most recent hope for a federal shield law was the Free Flow 
of Information Act of 2017, a house bill introduced on November 14, 
2017, by Representative Jamie Raskin.185 The bill is identical to the 
Free Flow of Information Act of 2007186 and was introduced after 
 
 179. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 689 n.28. 
 180. S. 2035, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 181. Upohar Haroon, Free Flow of Information Act, FIRST AMENDMENT ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1083/free-flow-of-information-act (last updated 
2018). Despite this, the bill had significant support from various major media companies including 
the Associated Press, the National Association of Broadcasters, Bloomberg News, CBS, 
ClearChannel, CNN, Cox, Gannett, Hearst, NBC, News Corporation, the New York Times, TIME, 
and the Washington Post. House Passes the Free Flow of Information Act, SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE 
(Oct. 16, 2007), https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/house-passes-the-free-flow-of-information-
act. 
 182. Federal Shield Law Efforts, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 
https://www.rcfp.org/federal-shield-law/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
 183. Id. 
 184. H.R. 2578, 114th Cong., H. Amendment 333 (2015) (“None of the funds made available 
by this Act may be used to compel a person to testify about information or sources that the person 
states in a motion to quash the subpoena that he has obtained as a journalist or reporter and that he 
regards as confidential.”); Josh Gerstein & Seung Min Kim, House Passes Reporter’s Shield 
Measure, Again, POLITICO (June 3, 2015, 6:44 PM), https://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-
radar/2015/06/house-passes-reporters-shield-measure-again-208206. 
 185. Free Flow of Information Act of 2017, H.R. 4382, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 186. Press Release, Jaime Raskin, U.S. Congressman, 8th Dist. of Md., Reps. Raskin & Jordan 
Introduce Bipartisan Federal Press Shield Law (Nov. 14, 2017), https://raskin.house.gov/media/ 
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then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions would not make a commitment 
not to jail journalists.187 The bill’s stated purpose was “[t]o maintain 
the free flow of information to the public by providing conditions for 
the federally compelled disclosure of information by certain persons 
connected with the news media.”188 The bill had twelve cosponsors, 
both Democratic and Republican.189 Raskin and supporters argued that 
the bill was vital to guarantee First Amendment protections by 
allowing journalists to protect confidential sources and be free of the 
fear of prosecution or jail time.190 As of December 2017, the bill was 
referred to the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland 
Security, and Investigations but was stalled until Congress adjourned 
on January 3, 2019.191 
The bill would have provided journalists a qualified privilege. 
Journalists would still be forced to reveal sources or documents related 
to their investigation if: (1) the party seeking to compel production 
could prove it had exhausted other options for obtaining the 
information,192 (2) the information sought was “critical” to the 
investigation,193 and (3) “the public interest in compelling disclosure 
of the information or document involved outweigh[ed] the public 
 
press-releases/reps-raskin-jordan-introduce-bipartisan-federal-press-shield-law [hereinafter Press 
Release of Jaime Raskin]. 
 187.  
I don’t know if I can make a blanket commitment to that effect. . . . [W]e have 
matters that involve the most serious national security issues that put our 
country at risk, and we will utilize the authorities that we have legally and 
constitutionally if we have to. We always try to find an alternative way . . . to 
directly confronting media persons. But that is not a total blanket protection. 
Oversight of the Department of Justice: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th 
Cong. (2017) (statement of Hon. Jefferson B. Sessions III, Att’y Gen. of the United States), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/10/18/2017/oversight-of-the-us-department-of-justice. 
 188. Free Flow of Information Act of 2017, H.R. 4382, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 189. Cosponsors were: Jim Jordan (R-OH 4th), Grace Meng (D-NY 6th), Eleanor Holmes 
Norton (D-DC), Alex X. Mooney (R-WV 2nd), John Yarmuth (D-KY 3rd), Mark Meadows 
(R-NC 11th), Debbie Wasserman Schultz (D-FL 23rd), Scott Taylor (R-VA 2nd), Sheila Jackson 
Lee (D-TX 18th), Michael Simpson (R-ID 2nd), and Robert A. Brady (D-PA 1st). H.R.4382—
Free Flow of Information Act of 2017, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-
congress/house-bill/4382/cosponsors?searchResultViewType=expanded&KWICView=false (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
 190. Press Release of Jaime Raskin, supra note 186. Familiarly, Raskin also commented on the 
democratic principle behind the freedom of the press, stating, “When the press is unable to do its 
job, the American people—and our ability to function as a democracy—suffer. A free press is the 
people’s best friend and the tyrant’s worst enemy.” Id. 
 191. H.R. 4382—Free Flow of Information Act of 2017, supra note 189. 
 192. Id. § 2(a)(1). 
 193. Id. § 2(a)(2). 
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interest in gathering or disseminating news or information.”194 The 
third of these requirements calls for a balancing test, not unlike that 
proposed by Justice Powell in Branzburg. The most obvious problem 
with this requirement is that it allows the courts substantial latitude to 
interpret the statute. It is entirely possible that certain courts or judges 
will consistently rule in favor of the government, making the statute a 
hollow symbol of protection for freedom of the press. 
The bill also included a caveat for when the disclosure of the 
identity of a source is “necessary to prevent, or to identify any 
perpetrator of, an act of terrorism against the United States or its allies 
or other significant and specified harm to national security with the 
objective to prevent such harm,”195 as well as other terrorist-related 
exceptions. These exceptions, which were largely uncontested by 
congressmembers and which have survived several iterations of the 
bill, fairly address concerns that journalists might improperly invoke 
the privilege when national security is an obvious concern. 
The bill also contained a restrictive definition of “journalist.” A 
“covered person” as defined by the Act is:  
a person who regularly gathers, prepares, collects, 
photographs, records, writes, edits, reports, or publishes 
news or information that concerns local, national, or 
international events or other matters of public interest for 
dissemination to the public for a substantial portion of the 
person’s livelihood or for substantial financial gain and 
includes a supervisor, employer, parent, subsidiary, or 
affiliate of such covered person.196  
This description would not encompass the emerging field of so-called 
“citizen journalists” and bloggers, which has become increasingly 
powerful as technology allows it to quickly reach large audiences.197 
Past iterations of the Free Flow of Information Act were stalled by 
similarly lengthy and restrictive definitions of a journalist, and state 
 
 194. Id. § 2(a)(4). 
 195. Id. § 2(a)(3)(A). 
 196. Id. § 4(2). 
 197. Alan Wehbé, The Free Press and National Security: Renewing the Case for a Federal 
Shield Law, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 512, 529–30 (2018); Dell Cameron, A New Media Shield 
Law Would Only Shield Corporate Media, VICE (Aug. 22, 2013, 1:14 PM), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/bn5g7a/the-new-media-shield-law-only-shields-corporate-
media. 
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shield laws also vary widely in how a journalist is defined.198 A 
stronger definition would focus on the intent of the individual rather 
than on his or her employment or the regularity of his or her reporting. 
The definition would also focus on the individual’s ability to analyze 
and verify the credibility of his or her sources and the information he 
or she is provided. These improvements would address both the 
concerns of opponents of the law who fear undeserved protections and 
the concerns of those who want to encompass new-style media outlets 
deserving of protection. 
IV.  PROPOSAL 
A.  Consequences of Not Protecting Journalists’ Sources by Statute 
The majority in Branzburg noted that “the press has flourished” 
without constitutional protection.199 However, the reality does not 
reflect that sentiment. As discussed above, the freedom of the press in 
the United States has never been assured.200 Continuing to leave 
journalists without assurances that they will be protected against 
government subpoenas and subjecting them to criminal contempt for 
refusing to reveal their sources does not leave the press “flourishing.” 
To continue without a federal shield law despite the support for 
such a proposal since the ruling on Branzburg would leave journalists 
in a state of limbo, relying on state protections, subjective balancing 
tests, or the whims of the current administration. As explained above, 
opponents of a federal shield law have argued that journalists are 
sufficiently protected without a shield law because of Department of 
Justice regulations on subpoenaing the media.201 However, proponents 
of a federal shield law point out that these regulations are insufficient 
because they are not enforced by the courts and because there is little 
to no punishment for officials who fail to follow them.202 The 
balancing test proposed by the regulations is highly subjective and 
could be manipulated based on the Department of Justice’s viewpoint 
on these considerations.203 
 
 198. Wehbé, supra note 197, at 532; Cameron, supra note 197. 
 199. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689–99 (1972). 
 200. Supra Part I. 
 201. Supra Part III. 
 202. Siegel, supra note 132, at 504. 
 203. Id. at 505. 
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The inevitable and dangerous result of leaving journalists without 
statutory protections against revealing their sources is that the 
government will be emboldened to induce disclosure of confidential 
sources and information by following through on subpoenas and 
sending principled journalists who refuse to give up their sources to 
jail. In the hands of the wrong organization, subpoenas can be used to 
harass journalists, interfere with their sources, or retaliate against 
journalists who are critical of the government. The fallout from these 
consequences is that sources will not reveal information in the first 
place because they do not have reliable protection against being 
identified. Despite the verve of the journalistic profession, sources will 
doubtless be deterred by the threat of being identified when the 
journalist is subpoenaed. Thus, without a sufficient shield law, the 
press will be unable to report about alternative viewpoints or 
subversive organizations, the very things the First Amendment was 
intended to protect. 
B.  Impact 
A federal shield law of any kind, whether qualified or absolute, 
would positively influence journalists and contribute to the freedom 
of the press in the United States. A federal shield law would resolve 
the inconsistencies resulting from the different interpretations of 
Branzburg among the federal courts, as well as provide uniform 
protection to journalists instead of forcing them to rely on the 
protections of the confusing patchwork of state shield laws. No longer 
would journalists and their sources depend on the whims of the 
Department of Justice or the discretion of the courts for protection. 
Increased protections for journalists will not prevent the 
government from protecting national security interests, as the two are 
not necessarily at odds. A qualified evidentiary privilege under a 
federal shield law can properly strike the balance between national 
security and the freedom of the press, both of which are necessary for 
a well-functioning democracy. And as technology improves, the 
government will find the need to rely on journalists for information 
dealing with national security less and less.204 
 
 204. Technology makes it easier for the government to get information through other channels 
and, in fact, has been cited as the main factor in the increase in leak prosecutions during the Obama 
administration. Joel Simon & Alexandra Ellerbeck, The President’s Phantom Threats, COLUM. 
JOURNALISM REV. (Winter 2018), https://www.cjr.org/special_report/president-threats-press.php. 
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C.  Solution 
The Supreme Court in Branzburg encouraged Congress to pass a 
federal shield law,205 and it is time that Congress act upon that 
invitation. Affording journalists a qualified evidentiary privilege is the 
best solution. Given the difficulty in passing any legislation,206 
legislation with a more moderate approach is the most viable option. 
Congress has thus far failed to create a federal shield law that garners 
enough bipartisan support to actually become law. However, there is 
considerable support for a shield law offering a qualified privilege, as 
evidenced by congressional support for the different iterations of the 
Free Flow of Information Act,207 the willingness of the courts to find 
an evidentiary privilege post-Branzburg,208 and the near nationwide 
creation of state shield laws by state legislatures.209 
The argument in favor of an evidentiary privilege is also well-
grounded in the rationale supporting existing privileges. The ability to 
remain anonymous is necessary to ensure the open communication 
between a source and a journalist that is needed for journalists to 
disseminate information to the public. The relationship between 
journalist and source serves the public interest and should be 
recognized, as other privileges, as an interest more important than the 
interest in providing the relevant information in a litigation. 
1.  Proposal 
The following is my proposal for a federal shield law, based 
largely on the Free Flow of Information Act of 2017 and edited with 
language from several state shield laws to properly strike the balance 
between national security and the freedom of the press: 
 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
 
This Act may be cited as the “Free Flow of Information Act.” 
 
 205. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972). 
 206. An analysis of data beginning with the 93rd Congress through the 115th Congress revealed 
only 6 percent of legislation introduced in a congressional session ever became law. In contrast, 80 
percent or more of legislation each session was introduced, referred to committee, or reported by 
committee but had no further action. Statistic and Historical Comparison, GOVTRACK, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
 207. Supra Part III. 
 208. Supra Part II. 
 209. Supra Part II. 
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SEC. 2. COMPELLED DISCLOSURE FROM COVERED 
PERSONS. 
 
(a) Conditions For Compelled Disclosure—In any matter arising 
under Federal law, a Federal entity may not compel a covered person 
to provide testimony or produce any document related to information 
obtained or created by such covered person as part of engaging in 
journalism unless a court determines by clear and convincing 
evidence, after providing notice and an opportunity to be heard to such 
covered person— 
 
(1) that the party seeking to compel production of such 
testimony or document has exhausted all possible alternative 
sources (other than the covered person) of the testimony or 
document; 
 
(2) in the case that the testimony or document sought could 
reveal the identity of a source of information or include any 
information that could reasonably be expected to lead to the 
discovery of the identity of such a source, that— 
 
(A) disclosure of the identity of such a source is 
necessary to prevent, or to identify any perpetrator of, an act 
of terrorism against the United States or its allies or other 
significant and specified harm to national security with the 
objective to prevent such harm; 
 
(B) (i) disclosure of the identity of such a source is 
essential to identify in a criminal investigation or prosecution 
a person who without authorization disclosed properly 
classified information and who at the time of such disclosure 
had authorized access to such information; and (ii) such 
unauthorized disclosure has caused or will cause significant 
and articulable harm to the national security; and 
 
(3) that compelling disclosure of the information or 
document involved is necessary to address harm to national 
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security which significantly outweighs the public interest in 
gathering or disseminating news or information. 
 
(b) Limitations On Content Of Information—The content of any 
testimony or document that is compelled under subsection (a) shall— 
 
(1) not be overbroad, unreasonable, or oppressive and, when 
possible, be limited to the purpose of verifying published 
information or describing any surrounding circumstances 
relevant to the accuracy of such published information; and 
 
(2) be narrowly tailored in subject matter and period of time 
covered so as to avoid compelling production of peripheral, 
nonessential, or speculative information. 
 
SEC. 3. COMPELLED DISCLOSURE FROM 
COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROVIDERS. 
 
(a) Conditions For Compelled Disclosure—With respect to 
testimony or any document consisting of any record, information, or 
other communication that relates to a business transaction between a 
communications service provider and a covered person, section 2 shall 
apply to such testimony or document if sought from the 
communications service provider in the same manner that such section 
applies to any testimony or document sought from a covered person. 
 
(b) Notice And Opportunity Provided To Covered Persons—A 
court may compel the testimony or disclosure of a document under 
this section only after the party seeking such a document provides the 
covered person who is a party to the business transaction described in 
subsection (a)— 
 
(1) notice of the subpoena or other compulsory request for 
such testimony or disclosure from the communications service 
provider not later than the time at which such subpoena or request 
is issued to the communications service provider; and 
 
(2) an opportunity to be heard before the court before the 
time at which the testimony or disclosure is compelled. 
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SEC. 4. APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
 
(a) Order Subject to Review—If a court determines that a covered 
person should be compelled to testify, the court’s determination shall 
immediately be subject to review by the court of appeals. The court of 
appeals shall make an independent determination of the applicability 
of the standards in this subsection to the facts in the record and shall 
not accord a presumption of correctness to the trial court’s findings. 
 
(b) Pendency of Appeal—During the pendency of the appeal, the 
privilege shall remain in full force and effect. 
 
SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS. 
 
In this Act: 
 
(1) COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROVIDER—The 
term “communications service provider”— 
 
(A) means any person that transmits information of the 
customer’s choosing by electronic means; and 
 
(B) includes a telecommunications carrier, an 
information service provider, an interactive computer service 
provider, and an information content provider (as such terms 
are defined in sections 153 and 230 of the Communications 
Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 153, 230)). 
 
(2) COVERED PERSON—The term “covered person” 
means a person who gathers, prepares, collects, photographs, 
records, writes, edits, reports, or publishes news or information 
with the intent of disseminating that news or information to the 
public and includes a supervisor, employer, parent, subsidiary, or 
affiliate of such covered person. Such term shall not include— 
 
(A) any person who is a foreign power or an agent of a 
foreign power, as such terms are defined in section 101 of 
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the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
1801); 
 
(B) any organization designated by the Secretary of 
State as a foreign terrorist organization in accordance with 
section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
1189); 
 
(C) any person included on the Annex to Executive 
Order No. 13224, of September 23, 2001, and any other 
person identified under section 1 of that executive order 
whose property and interests in property are blocked by that 
section;210 
 
(D) any person who is a specially designated terrorist, 
as that term is defined in section 595.311 of title 31, Code of 
Federal Regulations (or any successor thereto); or 
 
(E) any terrorist organization, as that term is defined in 
section 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II)). 
 
(3) DOCUMENT—The term “document” means writings, 
recordings, and photographs, as those terms are defined by 
Federal Rule of Evidence 1001 (28 U.S.C. App.). 
 
(4) FEDERAL ENTITY—The term “federal entity” means 
an entity or employee of the judicial or executive branch or an 
administrative agency of the Federal Government with the power 
to issue a subpoena or issue other compulsory process. 
 
(5) JOURNALISM—The term “journalism” means the 
gathering, preparing, collecting, writing, editing, filming, taping, 
or photographing news and information with the intent of 
disseminating that news or information to the public. 
 
 210. Executive Order 13,224 was issued in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks and has 
been regularly updated since. The intent of the order is to disrupt the financial support of terrorist 
organizations. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001). 
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2.  Explanation of Proposal 
The first significant change in this proposed legislation from the 
Free Flow of Information Act of 2017 is that it increases the burden of 
proof on the government from a “preponderance of the evidence” to 
“clear and convincing evidence.” The increased burden of proof gives 
the court less discretion and makes it more difficult for a journalist to 
be required to reveal the identity of a confidential source or otherwise 
confidential information. As several states currently use the clear and 
convincing evidence standard in their state shield law provisions,211 
this is not an unworkable standard. This proposed legislation also 
increases the burden on the government to prove that compelling 
disclosure is necessary for national security purposes to place the 
presumption against disclosure and prevent the manipulation by the 
government that a weaker standard would allow. 
This proposed legislation also removes the Free Flow of 
Information Act of 2017’s differentiations in standards between civil 
and criminal cases, which draw from the differences enshrined in the 
Department of Justice guidelines. These standards are rejected 
because again they are too subjective and leave too much discretion to 
the courts, as they require the courts to interpret what “reasonable 
grounds,” “critical to the investigation,” or “critical to the successful 
completion of the matter” mean. Again, these standards are too 
subjective and are thus vulnerable to manipulation by the government. 
This proposed legislation also eliminates several exceptions from 
the Free Flow of Information Act of 2017 that are not concerned with 
national security but does retain those dealing with national security, 
including the terrorism exceptions to the definition of a “covered 
person.” While future legislation can address any other potential 
reasonable exemptions to a journalist’s privilege against being 
compelled to reveal confidential information, the current academic 
and political struggle is over national security exemptions to the 
privilege. Although other provisions may be controversial, terrorism 
exemptions have persisted in several iterations of proposed federal 
shield laws. 
 
 211. District of Columbia (D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-4703 (West 2019)), Maryland (MD. CODE 
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (West 2019)), Minnesota (MINN. STAT. §§ 595.021–595.025 
(2019)), Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West 2019)), and Tennessee (TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 24-1-208 (2019)). 
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This proposed legislation also adds a provision similar to that of 
several state shield laws,212 which provides for the immediate and 
independent review of an order to compel the journalist to testify. This 
provision is necessary to ensure that under this qualified scheme, the 
necessarily remaining subjective elements of the shield law are not 
abused. By providing an immediate check on any orders to compel 
testimony, journalists will have yet another protection from being 
forced to choose between making unwarranted disclosure and facing 
jail time or other sanctions. 
Lastly, this proposed legislation also modifies the definition of a 
“covered person” and “journalism” in an effort to be more inclusive. 
This proposed definition is less focused on the covered person’s status 
as regularly employed by a news media organization and encompasses 
citizen journalists and online or independent publishers who uphold 
the same ethical standards as traditional journalists. Thus, this 
definition strikes the balance between those concerned with the over-
inclusiveness of a federal shield law and those concerned with 
providing protections for the emergence of less traditional journalists. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
A federal shield law is many years overdue, and a qualified shield 
law is the most realistic means of accomplishing the goal of providing 
journalists with necessary protection. Relying on the discretion of the 
Department of Justice without any method of redress is simply 
insufficient. The Framers intended for the press to serve as a check on 
the government, and allowing journalists to promise their confidential 
sources that they will remain confidential is necessary for the flow of 
information from a source to a journalist, and from the journalist to 
the public. The rationale behind a federal shield law is identical to that 
of existing privileges: to promote full and frank communication 
between parties. 
A qualified federal shield law like the one proposed in this Note 
would properly strike the balance between the need for journalistic 
integrity and the national security concerns of the government. By 
 
 212. Alaska (ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.300–09.25.390 (2014)), Illinois (735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/8-901 to 5/8-909 (2019)), Louisiana (LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451–45:1454, 45:1459 (2019)), 
Minnesota (MINN. STAT. §§ 595.021–595.025 (2019)), New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7 
(West 2019)), Rhode Island (9 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 9-19.1-1 to 9-19.1-3 (West 2019)), and 
Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (2019)). 
(11) 53.3_WENTWORTH (DO NOT DELETE) 7/10/2020  12:29 PM 
2020] ARGUMENT FOR A FEDERAL SHIELD LAW 785 
eliminating much of the subjective nature of a qualified privilege, the 
proposed legislation would provide much needed uniformity to the 
current scheme of privilege, which is a patchwork of widely varied 
state protections and inconsistent federal interpretations of Branzburg. 
If Congress is committed to ensuring the freedom of the press and 
ensuring protections in an increasingly evolving landscape of news 
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